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ABSTRACT
The chemical processing industry has faced challenges with achieving improvements in safety
performance, and accidents continue to occur. When accidents occur, they usually have a
confluence of multiple factors, suggesting that there are underlying complex systemic problems.
Moreover, accident investigations often reveal that accidents were preventable and that many of
the problems were known prior to those accidents, suggesting that there may have been early
warning signs.
System-based analysis addresses systemic aspects and leading indicators enable the detection of
ineffective controls and degradation of the system. Together, they could enable taking needed
actions before an incident or a loss event. To develop process safety indicators, the chemical
processing industry currently uses guidelines that are mainly based on the concepts of the "Swiss
Cheese Model" and the "Accident Pyramid." The current guidelines lack a systemic approach
for developing process safety indicators; the guidelines view indicators as independent measures
of the safety of a system (e.g. a failure of a barrier), which can be misleading because it would
not identify ineffective controls, such as those associated with the migration of the system
towards an unsafe state, or associated with interdependencies between barriers. Moreover,
process safety indicators that are currently used in the chemical industry are more focused on
lagging as opposed to leading indicators.
This main objective of this thesis is to develop a structured system-based method that can assist a
hydrocarbon/chemical processing organization in developing system-based process safety
leading indicators. Building on developed safety control structures and the associated safety
constraints, the proposed method can be used to develop both technical and organizational
leading indicators based on the controls, feedbacks, and process models, which, ultimately, can
ensure that there is an effective control structure.
Thesis Supervisor: Nancy G. Leveson
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The chemical processing industry has changed considerably over the past several decades, and
has become more advanced and complex. Technology has focused on safer designs, companies
have established operating procedures and safety management systems, and best practices are
being shared between companies. To further enable and make standards and procedures more
effective, companies have attempted to tackle cultural norms in an effort to promote healthier
safety cultures, and, thus, improve safety performance. However, companies continue to
struggle with achieving improvements in safety performance, and accidents continue to occur.
When accidents occur, they usually have a confluence of multiple factors, suggesting that there
are underlying complex systemic problems. Moreover, accident investigations often reveal that
accidents were preventable and that many of the problems were known prior to those accidents,
suggesting that there may have been early warning signs.
System-based analysis addresses systemic aspects and process safety indicators enable the
detection of ineffective controls and degradation of the system. Together, they could enable
taking needed actions before an incident or a loss of containment event happens in a complex
system. It is vital that process safety indicators focus on leading indicators rather than lagging
ones. Lagging indicators measure incidents after they occur, while leading indicators are
proactive and forward looking measures that can identify performance degradation or
deterioration of the system prior to an incident. These indicators go hand-in-hand. However, this
research is focused on leading indicators that enable proactive risk management. This Chapter
discusses the problem, current techniques that are used, and what is proposed to be done
differently to improve the process.
1.1 THE PROBLEM
Process safety indicators that are currently used in the chemical processing industry are more
focused on lagging as opposed to leading indicators. There have been attempts in the industry to
develop leading indicators, but these efforts have fallen short of addressing the systemic aspects
that can enable the possibility of predicting potential incidents before they occur or detecting the
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migration of a system to an unsafe state. Most companies have established risk management
programs that are either reactive (lack a forward-looking approach), or fragmented (system-
based models are not used). A risk management program and the associated decision-making
can only be effective if it considers the system as a whole and its dynamics, and if it is proactive
enough to enable early actions.
1.2 BACKGROUND: TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY USED
To develop process safety indicators, the chemical processing industry currently uses guidelines
provided by government regulators or professional organizations such as the UK HSE, OECD,
API and CCPS. These guidelines are mainly based on the concepts of the "Swiss Cheese
Model" by James T. Reason and the "Accident Pyramid" by H. W. Heinrich. The current
guidelines used by the industry lack a systemic approach for developing process safety
indicators; the guidelines view indicators as independent measures of the safety of a system (e.g.
a failure of a barrier), which can be misleading because it would not identify ineffective controls,
such as those associated with the migration of the system towards an unsafe state, or associated
with interdependencies between barriers.
There have been several attempts in the process industry to improve the way process safety
leading indicators are developed to monitor and improve safety performance. Recently, the
process industry collectively began to place a significant focus on process safety indicators, and
redefined how indicators should be developed by issuing a series of guidelines. These guidelines
lack the systems approach, particularly involving the following aspects:
e They lack a structured systematic framework that can systemically facilitate obtaining
feedback on the state of the system during the different phases of the lifecycle or during
the different states of operations.
" Although the new guidelines have clarified the differences between personal versus
process safety indicators, as well as leading versus lagging indicators, there are still
vague definitions of their application.
e Organizational aspects are covered by some of the guidelines, but not in a systematic
way. Moreover, addressing interdependences of system components is not covered.
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* Current guidelines rely on hazard identification techniques that consider only linear
chains of events.
e The guidelines do not provide a framework for monitoring the performance of the system
as a whole. They provide significant focus on individual indicators versus aggregate ones.
In summary, these guidelines do not provide a structured mechanism for developing process
safety indicators that can proactively detect system performance degradation.
1.3 RESEARCH GOAL AND HYPOTHESIS: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE DIFFERENTLY?
The primary aim of this research thesis is to answer the following question: "How can a
hydrocarbon/chemical processing organization develop system-based process safety leading
indicators for the purpose of systematically and proactively managing risk?"
The objective of this research is to develop a method that can assist managers and decision-
makers in proactively managing risk in their organizations by identifying better means for
developing leading indicators that can monitor systemic factors and, thus, prevent incidents
before they occur. A more systematic review that would enable a better understanding of the
system, as well as the complex interactions within its subsystems, and external factors is needed
to provide better risk management. The hypothesis used in this research is that STAMP-based
modeling concepts can be used to achieve this objective. This provides for a better
understanding of the system, helps in identifying better means for developing leading indicators,
assists in monitoring a system's status, and, thus, helps in making timely informed decisions to
prevent accidents from occurring or to identify needs for safety improvements.
1.4 RESEARCH APPROACH
In order to answer the research question, this research involves reviewing the literature and
current practices, defining gaps particularly in the use of a systems approach for developing
leading indicators in the process industry, exploring means for building on safety control
structures, and developing a system-based method that can be used to develop leading indicators
to proactively manage risk.
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2.0 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This Chapter provides background information on some of the essential concepts that are related
to systems theory, systems safety, and leading indicators. The latter part of the Chapter
summarizes the findings from a literature review, which include descriptions of the current state
of the techniques used, their new contributions, and their shortcomings particularly as they relate
to the systems approach.
2.1 SYSTEMS THEORY
Systems theory is the "interdisciplinary study of systems in general, with the goal of elucidating
principles that can be applied to all types of systems at all nesting levels in all fields of research
[1]." Booton and Ramo defined systems engineering as the design of the whole rather than the
individual parts. They state that the "systems engineer harmonizes optimally an ensemble of
subsystems and components [2]."
Systems theory is based on non-linear events and dynamics as well as feedback or feed-forward
control. It also includes cognitive, psychological, organizational, and social aspects. The
systems approach involves defining goals, formulating the problem, developing objectives,
developing alternatives, and selecting the best alternatives [3]. The concepts of systems theory
and the implementation of systems engineering date back to the mid-1900s, with major
applications of the associated concepts during the development of railroad systems and telephone
systems, as well as applications in World War II [2].
2.1.1 Chemical Processes as Complex Engineering and Socio-Technical Systems
Leveson states that, "while abstractions and simplifications are useful in dealing with complex
systems and problems, those that are counter to reality can hinder us from making forward
progress [4]." Complex systems are different from traditional systems in that they involve a high
level of automation, social aspects, and complex internal and external interactions. System
engineering concepts based on reductionism, like those developed in earlier times, may not be
appropriate for complex systems. This is due to the intersection of natural science and human
16
social systems, as was recognized by Bertalanffy in the General Systems Theory [5]. C. Perrow
has described some attributes of socio-technical complex systems [6]:
e Large problem space * Dynamic properties
* Social interaction * Hazards in operations
* Heterogeneous perspectives * Automation
* Distributed nature * Uncertainty in the data
These attributes apply equally well to processing facilities in the chemical processing industry.
2.1.2 Systems Safety and Safety as a Control Problem
Checkland suggested that "systems thinking is founded upon two pairs of ideas, those of
emergence and hierarchy, and communication and control [7]." Leveson also suggested that
safety is an emergent system property and that safety should be treated as a control problem for
complex systems [8]. Systems safety concepts extends to addressing complex interactions, and
in complex systems, according to Leveson, analyzing the system can not only prevent similar
accidents, but also other types of future accidents by evaluating dysfunctional interactions
between system components [4]. Investigations of catastrophic incidents such as Longford,
Piper Alpha, and BP Texas City have identified multiple systemic flaws and common safety
culture weaknesses. "Process safety' incidents are rarely caused by a single catastrophic failure,
but rather by multiple events or failures that coincide and collectively result in an incident [9]."
Risk management efforts should not only focus on addressing previous accidents, because
different interactions of the system and the social aspects may result in unforeseen inadequate
control.
The term "process safety" is used more widely than "system safety" in the chemical process industry. The process
safety concept probably began in the early 19th century in a du Pont black powder plant [10]. However, this was a
self-regulated effort on the part of du Pont, and regulations of the chemical process industry most likely began to be
formalized following the 1974 Flixborough disaster. Since then, process safety technology has advanced and loss
prevention principles have been formulated in an effort to prevent loss of containment of hazardous material. In the
1980s, the industry recognized that technology alone would not result in process safety improvements and that there
is a need for process safety management. "The evolution of process safety from a purely technical issue to one that
demanded management approaches was essential to continued process safety improvement [11]." Process safety has
been addressed through prescriptive and performance based regulations. Regulations in the chemical processing
industry vary from country to country and they are often a combination of prescriptive and performance-based
regulations. In the U.S., regulations are largely prescriptive and partly performance-based with the introduction of
OSHA's Process Safety Management (PSM) requirements in 1991 [12].
17
2.1.3 Control and Plant States
The traditional view of risk control or risk reduction strategies are based on a linear view of the
barriers that are in place [13]. This begins with a certain risk level and layers of protection are
added to reduce the level of risk, as seen in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Traditional Risk Reduction Principle
(Adopted from IEC 61508 [14])
This traditional view relies heavily on the chain of events model. However, a systems view of
risk reduction requires treating safety as a control problem. Controls can be physical,
organizational, or social, as seen in Figure 2.2.
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I Positive Control: Organizational Inadequate Control: Organizational
0
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0
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Positive Control: Physical
Figure 2.2: Systems View of Controls to Reduce Risk
Such controls can have varying degrees of impact on risk reduction. It can be argued that
addressing systemic aspects can have a greater effect on risk reduction, while addressing specific
physical or component failures may not be as effective. These effects on risk reduction are
demonstrated in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Risk Reduction Impact
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Accidents occur due to ineffective controls, including those that gradually develop over time and
involve the combinations of smaller failures caused by people and failures of the physical
equipment [15]. Processing plants gradually change their states from normal to emergency
modes of operations, as illustrated in Figure 2.4.
contro measure Is
Emergency
Abnormal
R Normal
Modeo Of rt~f
Loss of Control
Figure 2.4: Plant States: Modes of Operation and Control
It can begin to drift from normal operations and, if no controls are in place, it will begin drifting
towards abnormal operations, subsequently followed by critical operations and, finally, an
emergency situation where loss of containment hazards can occur. Safety controls prevent a
system from moving towards an abnormal state. Moreover, controls can bring the system back
to normal operations, which can vary depending on the state of the plant, from mitigation,
prevention, control, or optimization.
Even for incidents that occur outside the chemical processing domain, socio-technical complex
systems involved in major accidents often have similar causes associated with inadequate
controls. At the different states from normal to abnormal, as well as from abnormal to
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emergency modes of operations, ineffective controls can be found through the use of leading
indicators. An example is shown in Figure 2.5.
Indications of migration from normal to abnormal situation
Operational
Deviations from normal operations
(number of times exceeding operating
limits, specs, constraints, etc.)
Increase in number of inspections and
PM overdue
Delays in automation and isolation
function test
Increase in number of people in the
process units
Lower building design efficiency
Increase in inventory increase
Increase in deviation from desing
standards
Procedural
Delayed/Outdated Hazard
Evaluations/Risk Analysis studies
Over-due process safety actions
(resulting from accident
investigations, hazard evaluations,
waivers, or compliance audits)
Over-due update of process safety
required operations and maintenance
procedures
Over-due inspections of safety
critical equipment completed on time
Backlog in Management of Change
(MOC)
Figure 2.5: Loss of Control Snapshot
2.2 LEADING INDICATORS
Leading indicators are "something that provides information that helps the user respond to
changing circumstances and take actions to achieve desired outcomes or avoid unwanted
outcomes [16]. "
According to Hollnagel and Woods, "in order to be in control it is necessary to know what has
happened (the past), what happens (the present) and what may happen (the future), as well as
knowing what to do and having the required resources to do it [17]." There are different
definitions for leading indicators that can be found in literature. Some definitions overlap with
each other. In general, leading indicators can be referred to as measures that can be used to
predict future performance. Kjellen defined them as "indicators that change before the actual
risk level has changed or signs of changing vulnerabilities [18]." Building on this definition,
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leading indicators will be defined for the purposes of this research, as measures that detect
ineffective control well before the risk level increases. Moreover, the terms "metric" and
"indicator" have been used interchangeably in many cases. This research thesis will use the term
"metric" for the process of how an indicator is developed, and the term "indicator" for what
needs to be measured.
The objective of developing leading indicators is to enable detecting ineffective controls early
enough before an accident occurs. This requires implementing a set of performance goals, so
that safety performance can be measured, monitored, and analyzed and corrective actions can be
taken. This can be achieved by instituting a program for process safety indicators with its
associated processes, conducting reviews periodically, evaluating and applying the required
process adjustments and corrective actions. Leading indicators should be developed part of a
continuous improvement program that has a component relating to developing and monitoring
leading indicators.
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2.3 TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY USED FOR DEVELOPING LEADING INDICATORS
Historically, there have been several attempts in the process industry to use process safety
indicators to monitor and improve safety performance. Early attempts to develop process safety
metrics guidance by the CCPS go back to the mid-1990's with the subsequent release of software
tools for performance measurements. In 2000, the BP Grangemouth Major Incident Investigation
report recommended that "companies should develop key performance indicators for major
hazards and ensure that process safety performance is monitored [19]." That report highlighted
key questions regarding the need for performance indicators for safety culture, leadership,
employee participation, as well as more specific processes such as management of change. It
also suggested that industries may have a false sense of safety performance due to their focus on
managing personal safety rates rather than process safety.
In 2003, the Working Group on Chemical Accidents (WGCA), chaired by the U.S. EPA, has
introduced "Guidance on Developing Safety Performance Indicators [20]." This was developed
by using the best practices implemented by different organizations. This document was
classified as an interim guidance report so that it could be tested in pilot programs. However,
industry implementation of these recommendations and the associated guidelines was limited to
some extent.
Only after the BP Texas City incident in 2005 did the process industry for the first time
collectively begin to place a significant focus on process safety indicators and subsequently
redefine how indicators should be developed. The Baker Panel Report recommended that "BP
should develop, implement, maintain, and periodically update an integrated set of leading and
lagging performance indicators for more effectively monitoring the process safety performance
[21]." The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) issued a
recommendation to develop "performance indicators for process safety in the refinery and
petrochemical industries to ensure that the standard identifies leading and lagging indicators for
nationwide public reporting as well as indicators for use at individual facilities, which should
include methods for the development and use of the performance indicators [22]."
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A series of documents and guidelines have been issued since then. The following timeline (in
Figure 2.6) shows the release of key guidance documents that should pave the way forward for
the implementation of process safety indicators and should influence their application in the
process industry.
Figure 2.6: Timeline for Developed Process Safety Performance Indicators Guidance used in the
Process Industry
To develop leading process safety indicators, the process industry currently uses guidelines
primarily provided by UK HSE, OECD, API and CCPS. The following sections discuss some of
the key documents used by the process industry, and provide some background information on
the basis of these documents, their new contributions to the process industry, as well as the areas
that they did not address.
2.3.1 UK HSE Guidance for Developing Process Safety Indicators; HSG254 (2006)
These guidelines were developed by the UK HSE and the Chemical Industries Association (CIA)
in collaboration with the process industry [23]. It outlines a six-stage process: establish a team;
develop the scope; identify risk controls; identify controls critical elements; collect data; and
review the results.
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The guidelines recommend starting by identifying "what can go wrong?" using traditional hazard
identification techniques, followed by defining each Risk Control System (RCS) that control
each of these hazards. In this document, each RCS represents a barrier based on the "Swiss-
Cheese" model, which, if it fails, can give rise to an accident. Leading indicators are developed
based on the barriers' failures, i.e., "holes" that are discovered during reviews, while lagging
indicators are developed based on "holes" that are discovered after an incident or near-miss
occurring.
The main new contribution of this document was its focus on leading indicators. Although
limited to some extent, it suggests using these indicators to provide early warnings against
deterioration or degradation. Another key addition was introducing the "dual assurance" concept
of leading and lagging indicators to ensure that safety controls were functioning as expected. It
also introduced the concept of using a hierarchical approach, where lower level indicators would
feed into higher level indicators in an organization with an emphasis on senior management
involvement. The suggested hierarchal approach is limited to communicating information from
an individual site level to higher levels in the organization using more generic indicators. They
suggest that this can be achieved through indexing and weighting low level indicators into higher
level indicators based on the importance of an individual site in the overall organization.
2.3.2 OECD Guidance on Developing Safety Performance Indicators (2008)
These guidelines were developed by the Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) Division of the
OECD in collaboration with the process industry [24]. It outlines a seven-stage process:
establish a team; identify key issues of concern; define lagging indicators; define leading
indicators; identify risk controls; identify controls critical elements; collect data and report
results; act on findings; and review performance and indicators. Unlike the UK HSE's document,
it provided more guidance on developing leading and lagging indicators. It also distinguishes
'act on recommendations' as a separate step.
The guidelines recommend starting by identifying critical potential hazards using, for example,
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), which could include "What-If' Analysis, Layers of Protection
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Analysis, Checklist Reviews, Quantitative Risk Analysis, etc. This is followed by defining areas
of concern, i.e. processes, procedures, etc. that are most critical to control risk. According to this
document, failure of such risk controls would result in an accident. Indicators are, then,
developed based on potential failures in the areas of concerns, or where there are ineffective
barriers. For each area of concern, the document provides a predetermined list or a "menu" for
potential lagging "outcome" or leading "activities" indicators. The lists are intended to support
organizations in identifying which ones are of particular interest to them.
The main new contributions of this document were differentiating outcome indicators (lagging)
from activities indicators (leading) along with additional details on their development. This
document provided guidance for setting priorities and ranking indicators as an aid to monitoring
and reducing the scope of indicators' development. It suggests that prioritization can be
achieved by assessing the potential consequences of failures of processes, procedures, etc. and
the likelihood of that happening. The document also provided guidance for setting targets,
monitoring policies' performance, and safety management. It highlighted the importance of
engaging the stakeholders and sharing knowledge within and outside a company as well as
monitoring performance early in a project lifecycle (i.e., in R&D, standards development, design
and inherent safety).
2.3.3 Center of Chemical Process Safety Guidance
The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), Center of Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS), issued a series of guidelines:
e Risk Based Process Safety (2007) [25]
e Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics (2008) [26]
e Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics (2010) [27]
The guidelines recommend categorization of indicators based on the "Accident Pyramid" and the
selection of indicators based on the "Swiss-Cheese" model. It refers to other guidelines, e.g.
HSG254, for identifying hazards and selecting indicators, and provides a list of suggested
leading indicators that can be used, which are based on process safety elements and based on
indicators' lists provided by other organizations. The main new contributions of these guidelines
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were that they highlighted the importance of communication and provided more guidance for
developing metrics based on targeted audiences within and outside an organization, as well as
the type of indictors to be reported and the frequency of reporting. They promoted the
development of consensus metrics and knowledge sharing among companies, as well as
promoting social interests, such as sustainability (reporting performance progress towards
sustainability) and demands for public transparency. They also addressed the need for a
performance-based safety management system.
2.3.4 API 754 "Process Safety Performance Indicators" (2010)
The guidelines were developed by the American Petroleum Institute. The purpose of this API is
to identify process safety leading and lagging indicators in the refining and petrochemical
industries [28]. Other personal safety and health safety indicators are not part of this
recommended practice. This API provides a framework for measuring activity, status or
performance that can be used to classify process safety indicators into four tiers of leading and
lagging indicators.
The guidelines recommend identifying leading indicators based traditional Process Hazard
Analysis (PHA) and risk assessments to define what can go wrong?, what are the consequences?,
what is the likelihood?, what are the most critical barriers?, etc. Alternatively, it recommends
using incident investigation findings to identify barriers that contributed to the incident, or using
what other have successfully used to develop leading indicators. The guidelines are based on the
assumptions of the "Swiss-Cheese" model that incidents result from failures of the barriers, and
it recommends categorization of indicators into tiers based on the "Accident Pyramid". The
document provides a set of leading indicators examples that can be used.
The main new contribution of this API is the tiering process for developing process safety
indicators. For example, it defines Tier 1 and 2 indicators which are somewhat lagging and
include, injury and/or fatality, fire or explosion, as well as flammable or toxic releases. On the
other hand, Tier 3 and 4 indicators are more leading indicators that can be indicative of process
safety system weaknesses that can lead to Tier 1 or Tier 2 incidents. Examples of Tier 3 and 4
are the number of training completed, inspections overdue, etc.
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2.3.5 Shortcomings and Summary
The problems with these guidelines are that they are primarily based on the concepts of James T.
Reason's "Swiss Cheese Model" and Christopher A. Hart's "Spinning Disks Model (Figure 2.7)
[28]. These models assume linear chains of events in accidents and do not address the complex
systemic causes of incidents. According to Reason in Managing the Risks of Organizational
Accidents, "major accidents result when a series of failings within several critical risk control
systems materialize concurrently [15]."
Swiss Cheese (Static) Model Spinning Disk (Dynamic) Model
Hazr Protective "Barriers"
"Weaknesses"
Protective Barriers 'Weaknesses" or "Hoies"
Figure 2.7: James T. Reason's "Swiss Cheese Model" and Christopher A. Hart's "Spinning
Disks Model"
(From API 754 [28])
Also, most of these guidelines are based on the H. W. Heinrich accident pyramid. For example,
the latest API uses this pyramid and groups accidents depending on their impact, into four tiers,
representing a continuum of process safety indicators, varying from leading to lagging. It starts
with Tier 1 as the most lagging and ends with Tier 4 as the most leading (Figure 2.8). While this
provides a logical differentiation between leading and lagging indicators and while it suggests
that high impact incidents are associated with precursor low impact incidents, there is no proof
that this pyramid applies to process safety or to complex systems.
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Figure 2.8: H.W. Heinrich's "Accident Pyramid"
(From API 754 [28])
While the concept that preventing a loss of containment is proactive, and mitigating the loss is
reactive, the concept still assumes linear chains of events. Because incidents occur when there
are complex interactions among events, there is a need for a more systematic view to account for
these nonlinear factors. In addition, these guidelines use risk and reliability as parts of their
recommendations. Most of them suggest using the likelihood of failures to reduce the scope of
development, which can be deceiving as this may result in overlooking low likelihood events.
The Heinrich proposal describes indicators as a continuum or time dependent, while the Swiss
Cheese model suggests that lagging indicators precede harm and focuses on the functionalities of
the safety barriers. Rather than discussing failures, near misses, incidents, or events, a complex
sociotechnical system must be reviewed to determine whether or not it is functioning safely.
Moreover, although some guidelines provide the means to address culture, policies, and
management system, integration and providing for feedback is lacking. Also, there is vague
guidance on how individual plants or different processing facilities in an organization should be
treated. For example, they do not cover transportation risks and do not fully address industrial
parks, as they suggest applying these concepts individually and not to a site as a whole.
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To summarize, Table 2.1 lists the new contributions of the previously discussed guidelines that
were developed for process safety indicators development in the process industry, as well as
those areas that they did not fully address.
Table 2.1: Summary of the Guidelines for Developing Process Safety Indicators
Guidance Main Difference/ Addition/ Contribution Main Shortcomings
UK HSE "Step-by-Step The focus on leading indicators Mainly based on the
Guide to Developing "Swiss Cheese Model"
Process Safety Performance The introduction of the "dual assurance"
Indicators, HSG254" concept
Mainly based on the
The introduction of the concept of using a concepts of the "Swiss
hierarchical approach and emphasis on senior Cheese Model" and
management involvement the "Accident
Pyramid"
OECD, "Guidance on The differentiation between outcome indicators
Safety Performance (lagging) and activities indicators (leading) System-based methods
Indicators" are not used
It provides guidance in setting priorities,
ranking indicators, and for setting targets There is a lack of
integrating indicators
It highlights the importance of engaging and providing
stakeholders and sharing knowledge within and feedback to the
outside a company as well as monitoring different lifecycle
performance early in a project lifecycle, i.e. in phases
R&D, Standards Development, Design and
Inherent safety They suggest using
CCPS, "Guidelines for Risk It highlights the importance of communication, likelihood to reduce
Based Process Safety," developing consensus metrics, and social the scope
"Process Safety Leading aspects
and Lagging Metric," and They suggest using
"Guidelines for Process It addressed the need for a performance based risk and reliability as
Safety Metrics" safe management system part of their
API 754, "Process Safety The introduction of a tiering process of recommendations
Performance Indicators for developing process safety indicators
the Refining and Vague definition of
Petrochemical Industries" the scope of
application
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3.0 SYSTEMS MODELING AND LEADING INDICATORS
3.1 ACCIDENT MODELS AND LEADING INDICATORS
3.1.1 Approaches to Accident Models
Because the goal of developing early warnings is to prevent accidents from occurring, it is
important to understand how accidents develop. Leveson [8], [30], [31], Hollnagel [32], and
Qureshi [33] have discussed different accident models and approaches to accident management.
In general, accident causality models are grouped into two main categories: traditional and
modem. Traditional accident models involve sequential, chain of events models. In contrast,
modem models involve systematic analyses in which complex interactions and structural
hierarchies in complex socio-technical systems are addressed.
Traditional sequential models were developed in the early 1940s by Heinrich [34] and later by
Reason's proposed "Swiss Cheese" Model [15]. As discussed by Leveson, these models have
limitations with regard to analyzing and understanding complex socio-technical systems [8],
[30], [31]. Although they provide simple graphical representation for developing scenarios, they
oversimplify causality and do not address interactions and complexities. Without addressing
system complexity, leading indicators would not properly detect ineffective controls. By
comparison, systemic models are intended to address the system as whole, rather than specific
component failures or deviations. Therefore, system-based accident analyses are more
appropriate to address system risk; accordingly, these were used in this research.
It is important that system-based models are used (i.e. STAMP, as in this research) to develop
leading process safety indicators that are appropriate to address ineffective controls. This is
important because most installations in the chemical processing industry are considered to be
complex engineered systems involving internal and external interactions among physical
equipment, people, and social aspects (discussed in Section 2.1.1). Leveson suggested that
system-based models (i.e. STAMP) would address such complexities [8], [30], [31]. Also,
catastrophic incidents in the chemical industry involve complex, multiple factors; there are
frequently couplings between different systems components and decisions are made under
certain operational pressures. The Piper Alpha and the BP Texas City incidents are notable
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examples of how accidents occur as a result of multiple independent events stemming from
system design flaws.
3.1.2 Introduction to STAMP
Safety is an emergent property of a system based on systems theory concepts and principles, as
discussed in Section 2.1.2. This emergent property results from the enforcement of safety-
related constraints on the behavior of the system components through design and operation [8].
Loss of containment in chemical processing complex socio-technical system results from
inadequate controls or lack of safety control enforcement. Systems Theoretic Accident Model
and Processes (STAMP) is a systemic accident model. It can be considered a comprehensive
model that addresses complex socio-technical systems, and with which proactive safety and risk
management strategies can be developed. Unlike traditional accident models that address
component failures and analyze accidents using the chain of events approach, STAMP treats
safety as a safety control problem in which enforcement of system safety constraints involve
physical, organizational, and/or social elements, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 [8].
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Figure 3.1: Generic STAMP Control Structure
(Developed by Leveson [8])
Control structures are based on controls and feedback. Using STAMP, the higher level control
components are analyzed to determine how the physical system controls might be violated.
Feedback comes in the form of communications with the higher levels of the hierarchy.
Feedback from physical systems derives from process parameter indicators, inspection test
results, preventive maintenance, and so on. Feedback from the staff to the line and higher
management levels, and to external bodies, drives from reports, data, etc.
3.1.3 Safety Control and Leading Indicators
To enable developing process safety leading indicators, safety needs to be addressed as a control
problem. Systems and their subsystems interact in unwanted ways, which result in conditions of
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inadequate control. It is important to identify these interactions and controls as a means to
develop proactive process safety indicators. Charles Perrow illustrated how unplanned and
tightly-coupled nonlinear complex interactions are characteristics that could make a socio-
technical system susceptible to degradation, increased level of risk, and potential accidents [6].
He stressed the time-dependence of coupling (i.e. the criticality of how coupled non-linear events
vary with the time available or slack time). In addition, it is necessary to establish indicator
targets at the different levels of a hierarchy, operating windows or envelopes, where the system
can operate safely.
Leading indicators can be developed by analyzing the safety controls at the different levels of the
hierarchy. An approach that can be taken is that if system safety constraints are violated and
inadequate controls results, then this would be an indication of system degradation that could
lead to a loss. By using STAMP, the control theory concepts are addressed by defining the
objectives/constraints, structure, functions/process, as well as the context in a holistic approach.
3.2 ADDRESSING THE SYSTEM DYNAMICS
STAMP-based modeling addresses the static safety control of the system, and does not address
the dynamics involved. The dynamics of the system needs to be analyzed so that the different
reinforcing pressures, feedbacks, expectations, etc. are incorporated to get a better understanding
of the dynamics of ineffective control, and, thus, having better decision-making. This will help
in evaluating what needs to be done for more proactive risk management, i.e. enabling early
actions to take corrective actions. The objective is to determine possible decisions that could
have a positive impact on the safety state of the system over time and to assess whether or not
these decisions reinforce safety improvement efforts.
3.2.1 Introduction to System Dynamics
The system dynamics field was created by Jay Forrester, an MIT Professor, in the 1950s.
System dynamics modeling is a tool that can help with understanding and evaluating complex
systems, as it addresses the technical, organizational, and social aspects of systems. It also helps
by assisting managers and decision makers in evaluating policies and their impacts over time.
The model is based on the non-linear dynamics of systems, as well as on the feedback and
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control concepts. Change, policy resistance, and response in a complex system can be analyzed
in a system dynamics modeling [35].
In system dynamics, a system is modeled using flows, stocks, and causal loops. The system
behavior and interactions (technical, organizational, and social), in addition to the associated
non-linearities are addressed by reinforcing (positive) feedback loops and balancing (negative)
feedback loops. The former results in positive reinforcing effects on the system's behavior,
while the latter results in negative, counter effects. The system can be analyzed, understood, and
explained by the behavior resulting from the interactions among these loops. "The most
complex behaviors usually arise from the interactions (feedbacks) among the components of the
system, not from the complexity of the components themselves [35]." Modeling can also
incorporate delays, which can introduce instability in the behavior of a system.
3.2.2 Incorporating the System Dynamics
The system dynamics model can be developed by tying, linking and mapping its components to
the developed STAMP control structure [36]. This can be achieved by navigating through the
different levels of the control structure to develop input information, internal variables, and
output information for each level, as well as interactions, information, feedback, and control
across the defined boundaries.
The model can be developed further by building on earlier developed archetypes or models.
There were a number of system dynamics modeling efforts, where reference modes, causal loop
diagrams, etc. were developed for either analyzing actual accidents or for developing safety
archetypes. They are based on conceptual understanding or theoretical foundations supported
with findings from actual loss incidents, which is referred to by Goh et al. as "theorizing-to-
practice" models [37]. Marais et al. provided a set of six system safety archetypes that could be
used for modeling common system dynamics behaviors that could lead to accidents [38]. The
archetypes developed by Marais et al. can be used to describe the qualitative nature of the
complexity of interactions and feedback, and to get insight on the underlying structure and
behavior of the system under study. Moreover, Rudolph and Repenning have studied
organizational collapses by discussing and simulating how systems under control respond to
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disturbances [39] through the use of system dynamics models. System dynamic modeling of
actual accidents or archetype models of accidents also offer a great learning opportunity for
modeling.
3.2.3 Feedback Loops
Feedback loops will influence whether or not system degradations would result in an increased
level of facility risk. Using safety monitoring in addition to reporting proves that, given the same
time allocation, hazards can be effectively controlled both in the long- and short-terms [40].
Based on this concept, two of the most important feedback loops that must be considered are:
Proactive Risk Reduction: This loop addresses taking corrective actions when there is an
increase in the leading indicators. The ability to detect degradation can be accomplished by
proactively detecting possible degradation of the system before an incident occurs. Therefore,
this loop captures system degradation through the proactive risk reduction loop, which has the
leading indicators feeding into it to detect degradation of the system or to detect an increased
level of risk.
Incident Learning: This loop addresses taking corrective actions based on lessons learned from
other incidents. Kletz highlighted that, for accidents in the chemical industry, there would be
similar incidents that have occurred a number of times in an organization prior to that accident's
occurrence [41]. The same conclusion was drawn by independent investigation reports of major
accidents. The investigation report of the Piper Alpha disaster [42] and those for the BP Texas
City Refinery accident in 2005 [21], [22] indicated that similar incidents had occurred, or that
problems were known prior to the occurrence of those accidents. "BP Texas City lacked a
reporting and learning culture. Reporting bad news was not encouraged and often Texas City
managers did not effectively investigate incidents or take appropriate corrective action [21]."
This suggests that incident learning could have been limited in those organizations. Cooke and
Rohleder suggested that, in order to reduce accidents, an organization incident learning system is
needed [43]. Therefore, using incident learning to prevent accidents could be used as a loop in
the model.
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Learning may not prevent all potential accidents, but it will uncover many of them and could
provide more insights into the chemical process or system that is being managed. This loop
complements the proactive risk reduction loop, as safety performance improvement could have
some limitations as the system becomes more complex. Amalberti indicated that reporting could
become less relevant for predicting major disasters in complex systems [44]. The two feedback
loops can be demonstrated in the following graph (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2: System Dynamics Loops
These feedback loops can be integrated into a system dynamics model if developed based on the
STAMP control structure. Figure 3.3 demonstrates incorporating these loops in the control of
process excursions, integrity degradation, and overdue risk assessment.
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System degradations part of the structure of the model were broken down and grouped into
process-related excursions, integrity-related degradation, and overdue risk assessments.
" Process excursions: corresponds to an increased level of risk due to demands and
activations of alarms, safety instrumented systems, relief valves, etc.
" Integrity degradation: corresponds to an increased level of risk due to inspections found
to be outside the limits, defective safety critical equipment, etc.
e Risk assessments: covers delays in engineering studies and reviews
These groups can, thus, be linked to the level of risk of the facility. They impact the system
degradation and level of risk, which can be improved if actions are taken to address any
deviations. Taking the necessary corrective actions, however, depends on the ability of the
organization to detect and acknowledge the information provided by leading indicators to
prevent degradations. This requires management commitment, and the organizational safety
culture, which can be addressed by other loops.
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3.3 ACCIDENTS AND INEFFECTIVE CONTROL - CASE STUDY
Accidents result from ineffective control. In this Section, the BP Texas City Incident will be
used to demonstrate how ineffective control resulted in this incident. The data were obtained
from the CSB and Baker Panel investigation reports [21], [22]. Some of this information was
limited. However, for purposes of this demonstration, the available information is sufficient.
3.3.1 Description of the System
In this case, the system involved in the accident are the Raffinate Splitter and the Blowdown
Drum (receives and quenches hydrocarbons from the Splitter relief systems, and vents vapor to
the atmosphere), as shown in Figure 3.4.
Safet Reler vases
Stack
Figure 3.4: Raffinate Splitter and the Blowdown Drum
(Reference: [22])
The incident occurred during a start-up of the Raffinate Splitter.
0 The Splitter was 85% liquid filled at high temperature and pressure;
e The pressure in the Splitter continued to increase rapidly;
e The vapor and liquid were relieved through the relief valves, which were connected to the
Blowdown Drum;
e The Blowdown Drum filled up quickly, and hydrocarbons were discharged from an
overhead stack to the atmosphere;
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e Liquids formed a pool on the ground;
* Vapors and aerosols/mist created a Vapor Cloud;
" The Vapor Cloud was ignited in a nearby congested area and was ignited, resulting in a
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE);
e Temporary trailers nearby were destroyed;
e People in or near the temporary trailers were injured or killed.
This processing unit was equipped with level and pressure controls, a shutdown system, and
overpressure protection. Overfills or overpressures would result in relieving hydrocarbons
through the relief valves, which are sent to the atmosphere in this case.
3.3.2 System Hazards, Safety Constraints, and Risk Control
In this case, the hazard can be defined as an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons from the
Blowdown Drum. Considering the following safety constraints:
SC. 1: Control the process within its design pressure,
SC. 2: Control the flow, accumulation, and level within the design limits, and
SC. 3: Maintain the integrity of the vessel and its associated accessories within the targets,
Responsibilities can be mapped to system components, as shown in Table 3.1:
Table 3.1: Mapping
Responsibility
Safety Constraints to System Components
System Component
SC 1. Control the process within its Physical System:
design pressure Vessel: Vessel Mechanical Design
Instrumentation: Level and pressure sensors, alarms, control
SC2. Control the flow, accumulation, system, shutdown system, and the relief valves
and level within the design limits
Operator and Engineers
SC.3 Maintain the integrity of the Maintenance Staff: Instrumentation technicians, electrical
vessel and its associated accessories technicians, and mechanics
within the targets
Inspection Staff: Mechanical inspectors and instrumentation
inspectors
Engineers and Line Managers
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The primary physical controls to prevent hazards from occurring are the level and pressure
controls, alarms, shutdown system(s), and the relief valves. Loss could occur if these physical
controls fail to function as expected. Some of the physical controls are listed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Physical Controls for the Blowdown Drum
Detection Mean Cause
Level and Pressure
Indication
High Level/Pressure
Alarms
Level/Pressure Control
Emergency Shutdown
System
Overpressure Protection
Passive Systems
Active Systems
Level indicators both local and at the control room
Requires action by the operator to reduce or shutdown inflow
Reducing or stopping inflow by means of automatic control
An instrumented system (with final shutdown devices) that shutdown
automatically and diverts excess flow to the relief/flare system
Relief valves that opens when pressure/level increases sending
hydrocarbons to the relief/flare system or the atmosphere if safe
In case of overflow, dikes and containment shall be used to prevent
liquids from traveling to other areas
Detection of gas will activate alarms, and fire detection will activate fire
protection systems
3.3.3 Control Structure
The control structure consists of the controls that are intended to prevent hazards from occurring.
By the dissection of BP's accident reports and from general knowledge of BP and the refining
industry in general, specific STPA-based control loops and the associated inadequate controls
can be developed for the following system components (controllers): operator, maintenance and
inspection staff, engineering staff, and line manager.
A simplified specific STPA-based control loop for the operator is shown in Figure 3.5. Other
control loops can be found in Appendix A.
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Control action not given
(e.g. failure to shutdown,
dysfunctional/unavailable
control/shutdown
systems)
Incorrect control action
(e.g. under designed relief
valve and vessel is not
designed to handle
maximum pressure or
level)
Delays in taking action
(e.g. due to pressures and
distractions)
Controller External
Contextual
Operator
Inconsistent, incomplete, or
incorrect process model Missing feedback (e.g.
unavailable data to detect
pressure or level increase)
Incorrect feedback (e.g.
calibration laws)
System Delays in feedback (e.g.
maintenance, and inspection
Controlled Process flaws)
Figure 3.5: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Operator
Inadequate controls that are associated with the developed control structure for the operator is
shown in Table 3.3. Inadequate controls associated with other control loops can be found in
Appendix A.
Table 3.3: Inadequate Control: Operator
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SC 1 &2 will not be satisfied if an increasing trend in pressure/level readings of the vessel is not
detected, or if the pressure/level readings exceed the design pressure/level envelop without
detection. Inadequate feedback are:
IC 1. Unavailable data to detect pressure/level increases
IC2. There are calibration flaws in the pressure/level sensors
IC3. There are maintenance flaws in fixing faulty pressure/level sensors
IC4. There are inspection flaws in inspecting the faulty sensors or measuring current working
pressure of the vessel and its components
Inadequate SC 1 &2 will not be satisfied if there are inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process model to
process address an increased pressure/level. Inadequate process model are:
Inadequate
feedback
model
IC5. Operational procedures have incorrect or missing pressure/level set points, particularly high
and critical pressures/levels
IC6. Previous increases of pressure/level that did not require taking actions, and did not result in any
consequences
IC7. Periodic reviews and updates of operational procedures are not conducted and the procedures
do not address updated operational pressure/level envelopes
IC8. Flaws in the automation system logic
Inadequate SC 1 &2 will not be satisfied if inadequate actions are taken when there is a pressure/level increase.
control Inadequate control actions are:
actions
IC9. The controller fails to timely shutdown on high pressure/level
IC 10. The shutdown systems is dysfunctional
IC 11. The relief valves are under-designed, and/or the vessel is not designed to handle the increased
pressure/level
There are many indications that the above inadequate controls and those listed in Appendix A
existed at BP Texas City Refinery prior the accident as summarized in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: BP Texas City case study- Examples of ineffective controls that existed prior to the
incident
Comprehensiveness Adequacy of controls (i.e. Functionality of controls Adaptability of
of controls (i.e. using the appropriate (i.e. ensuring they are controls (i.e.
covering all controls) implemented and not controls address
hazards) degraded) changes in the
system)
Detect flaws Not detecting Not detecting Not detecting degraded Not detecting
(Feedback) missing constraints: inadequate constraints: safety constraints: changes
impacting safety
Hazards analysis Used atmospheric venting No data available for the constraints:
overlooked some instead of a closed system operators to know about
hazards (e.g. H2S for the blowdown drum overfills Introducing more
hazards) people during
Used inadequate The set-points were not startup was not
Hazards analysis redundancy for level known to operations. The evaluated
overlooked previous indication optional procedures or
blowdown drum training materials did not Pressure Control
overfill incidents No waivers were used for have these data Valve was
the blowdown drum and chained with no
Decisions stack as they did not meet MOC
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overlooked process standards The startup procedure was
hazards not updated to include Locating trailers
Internal standards allowed blowdown hazards went through the
the location of the trailers (particularly with the MOC and was
close to process units previous events occurring) approved despite
the hazards
Define Cost pressures Cost pressures resulted in Investigation process is MOC process was
factors that focused efforts on using less expensive not effective (only two of not used for all
resulted in integrity issues and options the eight serious changes
the flaws not process hazards blowdown drum incidents
(This can be Standards were not were investigated)
achieved Incident learning validated
using from previous Out of date procedure
CAST) incidents is limited Waiver process was not
and no formal effective Ineffective startup
lessons learned procedure (started up with
process known problems)
Ineffective hazard Poor inspection and
analysis procedures maintenance at several
facilities
Take No evidence of No evidence of taking There were many detected No evidence of
corrective taking corrective corrective actions related degradations with no taking corrective
actions actions related to the to the above flaws, evidence of taking actions related to
above flaws, particularly when they corrective actions: the above flaws,
particularly when were not detected or particularly when
they were not believed to be adequate There were many studies they were not
detected concluding integrity detected or not
degradation and operating carefully
envelope risks reviewed
There were many loss of
containment events
Actions relating to the
blowdown system were
not implemented.
Management decided not
to eliminate atmospheric
blowdown systems
Level transmitter repairs
were deferred
Overdue inspections (in
many of BP's sites)
Needed maintenance was
not performed during
turnarounds
Monitor Process Safety Process Safety Leading Process Safety Leading Process Safet
progress and Leading Indicators Indicators Indicators Leading
effectiveness Indicators
ofthe Extent of detecting Extent of detecting Extent of implementing
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process unidentified inadequate controls, and controls Extent of changes
(Feedback) hazards, and reviews of design in controls based
reviews of the risk standards process Extent of controls on system
assessment process degradations changes
Extent of investigating
Extent of factors leading to this Extent of reviews and Extent of reviews,
investigating factors updates of operating implementation of
leading to this procedures the MOC process
Extent of investigating Extent of
factors leading to this investigating
factors leading to
this
In summary, for the BP Texas City Incident, ineffective control resulted from the following.
* Detection was not effective. There was ineffective detection of missing hazards, and
repeated incidents were not considered when designing controls.
* Analysis was not effective. There were ineffective analyses of the flaws; some of the
problems were known, but were not investigated or analyzed.
* Correcting flaws was not effective. There were ineffective interventions; some of the
problems were known, but the company did not take the necessary actions to correct
them.
* Monitoring was not effective. This was due to ineffective monitoring of the extent to
which safety constraints were implemented, flaws that were found, how they were
analyzed, and the extent to which corrective actions were taken. Having feedback
(leading indicators) could have prevented this. These indicators could have been
developed based on the above analysis for detecting flaws and monitoring progress.
Figure 3.6 demonstrates the ineffective controls at the BP Texas City Refinery Incident.
46
Figure 3.6: BP Texas City Incident - Ineffective Control
Therefore, this case study supports that accidents result from ineffective control. Leading
indicators are needed to detect such ineffective control, so that incidents can be prevented (if the
indicators were appropriately monitored and actions were taken).
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4.0 SYSTEM-BASED METHOD
4.1 OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this Chapter is to develop a method that can assist a hydrocarbon/chemical
processing organization in developing system-based process safety leading indicators.
In this analysis it is assumed that organizations have already designed a good organizational
control structure, and that hazards have been identified, and associated controls are in place, and
that these organizations are continuing to look for ways to find weaknesses in their control
structure in order to improve it. Even with a presumably good control structure, accidents
continue to occur. This can be attributed to the following major reasons.
" During the design and development phase of a facility, some hazards may not have been
identified and some risks may have been overlooked. There could also be design flaws
resulting from applying inadequate technologies to control the risks, or resulting from
using improper assumptions, such as assuming that certain scenarios are not likely to
occur and excluding them from design considerations. Additionally, system hazards
arising from complex system interactions may not have been fully understood or
anticipated at this phase.
* During the construction and operational phases, hazard controls that have been designed
may not have been implemented or may not have been implemented as intended. Also,
implemented controls may become ineffective over time and safety constraints may be
violated2.
* During the operational phase, new risks arise due to either (1) changes within the system
(physical or organizational), which could include complacency, personnel changes, etc.,
or (2) changes or influences from outside the system, which could include population
encroachment, pressures from government agencies, etc.
Therefore, to ensure that there is an effective control structure, it is important to have the means
to proactively correct flaws, uncover mistakes, and address changes in the control structure and
2 Leveson highlighted that "not only must the assumptions and design rationale be conveyed to those who will
operate the system, but there need to be safeguards against changes over time that violate those assumptions [31]."
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changes in the environment before an accident occurs3. Incorporating effective leading
indicators can be the means to achieve this. They can be used either to determine if the designed
control structure works and addresses all hazards and changes, or to provide early warnings if the
controls are not working as intended or have deteriorated over time and have become ineffective.
Because systems could slowly move towards a state of higher risk, there should also be a
feedback mechanism or indicators that can enable detecting this migration to allow for timely
intervention. Table 4.1 summarizes what leading indicators should achieve.
Table 4.1: Goals for Leading Indicators
Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of Goals for the Leading Indicators
the Control Structure
Unidentified hazards
Design flaws (e.g. applying inadequate
technologies to control risks)
They should detect flaws in the hazard analysis conducted
during the design and identify factors that caused overlooking
hazards, or flawed analysis of identified hazards. Also, they
should identify hazards that may be new because of changing
environmental conditions.
They should detect design flaws and flaws in the design process
that resulted in applying inadequate controls.
Improper implementation of hazard They should detect improper implementation of controls or lack
controls of their implementation.
Controls deterioration over time and They should detect if the system is not being operated as
safety constraints violations designed or is being operated outside its operational envelop.
Also, they should detect if safety constraints are violated. More
importantly, they should detect these prior to exceeding the
operational envelop and violating safety constraints.
Internal or external changes They should detect if any change(s) is/are not adequately
evaluated for safety, reviewed, approved, or implemented
There are additional benefits for having leading indicators, although they are not primary goals.
They can facilitate internal and external communications, improve preparedness for events, and
improve the management of other business aspects4 . Relying on current guidelines for leading
3 Accident investigations often reveal that accidents could have been prevented as problems were known before
those accidents occurred. For example, the 1997 incident at the Tosco Refinery in California could have been
prevented if the temperature excursions occurred prior to the accident were investigated and controls were put in
place [27].
4 "If you are not managing process safety well, you are probably not managing other things well [27]"
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indicators or limiting feedback on accidents may not provide the insights that are needed to
understand complex systems and prevent accidents before they occur.
4.2 DEVELOPING A SYSTEM-BASED METHOD
Identifying leading indicators starts with conducting hazard analysis, and developing safety
constraints and high level requirements. Leveson highlighted that "detecting migration toward
riskier behavior starts with identifying baseline requirements. The requirements follow from the
hazard analysis [31]." She further states that "the identification of system safety constraints does
provide the possibility of identifying leading indicators applicable to a specific system [31]."
It was previously assumed that organizations would already have designed a good organizational
control structure, hazards were identified, and the associated controls were in place. Starting
with the developed safety constraints, this section proposes a method that can be used to achieve
the goals for leading indicators (stated in Section 4.1), and, ultimately, ensure that there is an
effective control structure.
4.2.1 Leading Indicators Goals
By reviewing the goals for leading indicators listed in Table 4.1, they can be summarized and
grouped into the following goals.
* Goal (G1): Ensure that controls are comprehensive (i.e. they cover all hazards). Safety
constraints should address all risks.
e Goal (G2): Ensure that controls are adequate (i.e. appropriate controls are used). Safety
constraints should use proper controls and technologies that are fit for the intended
purpose.
e Goal (G3): Ensure controls' functionality (i.e., controls are not degraded over time).
Safety constraints must be implemented properly and continue to be valid and maintained
at all times.
* Goal (G4): Ensure controls' adaptability (i.e., controls address all changes occurring
within or outside the system).
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4.2.2 Achieving the Goals - Leading Indicators Development Process
To achieve these goals, there should be a process that can facilitate this. Each specific goal
(stated in Table 4.1) requires detecting flaws. To ensure that there is an effective control
structure, the process should also ensure the identification of factors resulting in the potential
flaws, address the flaws at a system level, and monitor the progress. Therefore, the process
should incorporate the following steps.
1. Detect flaws by collecting data. This can be achieved through risk assessments, audits,
monitoring trends, etc. The collected data can be used as feedback and as leading
indicators.
2. Identify those factors that resulted in the flaws through a formal analysis. This can be
achieved using CAST5 ; the findings of this analysis feed into the next step.
3. Take corrective actions to address the flaws and update the process models. This can be
achieved by implementing the recommendations from the previous step, and by ensuring
they are addressed at the system level and not only at the subsystem analyzed.
4. Monitor progress and effectiveness of the process by collecting data. This can be
achieved by collecting data that reflect the progress and effectiveness of the previous
steps and the overall process. The collected data can be used as feedback and as leading
indicators.
These steps are intended to ensure that there is effective control. Figure 4.1 illustrates how these
steps can be achieved, and Figure 4.2 shows how they can be used to develop leading indicators.
5 Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) is a systematic approach to accident analysis. "CAST can be used to
identify the questions that need to be answered to fully understand why the accident occurred [31]."
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Figure 4.1: Process for Ensuring Effective Control
U. Detect Flaws
Feedback (Leading Indicators)
Figure 4.2: Leading Indicators Development Process (Engine)
As a result of applying the above process to each of the goals, leading indicators can be
generated. Table 4.2 provides guidance and demonstrates how this can be achieved.
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2. Define Factors
Reslt1ing InI the
Flaws
3. Take
Corrective
Actionls to
Address the
Factors
4. Monitor
Prerss and
Effectiveness of
the Process
Table 4.2: Summary of how the goals for leading indicators can be achieved using the leading
indicators development process "engine."
Top row represents the different goals of the leading indicators. The following rows demonstrate how they can be
achieved via the process (engine) steps shown in the left columns.
Cells highlighted in green can be considered as feedback (leading indicators).
Gi: Ensure G2: Ensure adequacy G3: Ensure G4: Ensure
comprehensiveness of of controls (i.e. using functionality of adaptability of controls
controls (i.e. covering the appropriate controls (i.e. ensuring (i.e. controls address
all hazards) controls) they are implemented changes in the system)
and not degraded)
Detect flaws Periodic validations Periodic reviews and Continuous Continuous monitoring
(Feedback) and updates of risk updates of design monitoring of data and of change
assessments and the standards and their trends related to authorizations,
risk assessment development process operational envelops reviews, hazard
process and integrity windows analysis, and
Periodic audits and implementations
Periodic audits and reviews of the design Periodic audits and
reviews process and reviews of operations, Periodic reviews of the
organization and cultural surveys Management of
Reporting and analysis Change (MOC)
of incidents and cross- Reporting and analysis Periodic reviews and Process
organizational learning of lessons learned updates of operational,
from the design maintenance, and
process and cross- inspection procedures
projects learning
Define
factors that
resulted in
the flaws
(This can be
achieved
using
CAST)
Defining factors that resulted in flaws being detected can be achieved by using proper tools like
CAST. There could be many factors that result in such flaws, which could include:
" Limited knowledge of the team working on risk analysis and designs, or reviewing changes. This
can be attributed to many factors, including those related to training and competency
" Bad judgments and decisions by staff or management due to, for instance, using probabilities or a
cost benefit analysis as a basis for their decisions, or using inadequate judgments on the
significance of physical changes, personnel changes, external changes, etc.
o Lack of quality6 work processes or procedures (risk assessment processes, design processes,
operational procedures, etc.)
e Lack of data to monitor or too much data to monitor
e Other factors including limited learning within the organization and resource limitations
Factors will vary from one organization to another depending on the detected flaws and the
appropriateness of the tools used to find factors resulting in flaws. Because this step is part of the
internal engine for developing leading indicators and not a source of feedback itself as discussed
earlier, the overall investigation process can be monitored and not the specific factors found.
Take To address factors that result in flaws being detected, taking corrective actions is necessary not only
corrective within the specific subsystem where a flaw was found, but at the system level. Similar to the
6 Quality process for the purpose of this research assumes that it follows the European Foundation for Quality
Management (EFQM) model
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previous step, corrective actions will vary from one organization to another depending on the
detected flaws and the factors identified. Factors can include improving processes related to
training, incident reporting and investigation, resource allocation, decision making process, standard
developments and updates, risk assessment process, etc. Because this step is also part of the internal
engine for developing leading indicators and not a source of feedback itself as discussed earlier, the
overall implementation can be monitored and not the specific corrective actions needed.
Monitor Extent of detecting
progress and unidentified hazards,
effectiveness and reviews of the risk
of the assessment process
process
(Feedback) Extent of investigating
factors leading to the
flaws
Progress of taking
relevant corrective
actions
Extent of detecting
inadequate controls,
and reviews of
standards and design
processes
Extent of investigating
factors leading to the
flaws
Progress of taking
relevant corrective
actions
Extent of
implementing controls
Extent of controls
degradations
Extent of inspection
and maintenance
backlog
Extent of reviews and
updates of operating
procedures
Extent of investigating
factors leading to the
flaws
Progress of taking
relevant corrective
actions
Extent of changes in
controls based on
system changes
Extent of reviews,
implementation of the
MOC process
Extent of investigating
factors leading to the
flaws
Progress of taking
relevant corrective
actions
4.2.3 Proposed Method
The leading indicators development process "engine" must be implemented within a structured
method to ensure its effectiveness. The following proposed method can be used to assist a
hydrocarbon/chemical processing organization in developing system-based process safety
leading indicators.
1. Establish a team, define the scope, and identify system boundaries.
2. Collect data for system hazards, requirements, safety constraints, and risk controls, as
well as for the developed control structure with responsibilities and feedback.
3. Use the leading indicators development process "engine" in conjunction with Table 4.2 to
develop leading indicators that are specific for the system under study to test if the
system-specific safety constraints are comprehensive, adequate, functional, and
adaptable. Particular focus should be given to the following areas.
a. Detecting flaws (feedback): The extent to which an organization detects missing,
inadequate, or degraded safety constraints.
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actions
b. Monitoring progress (feedback): The extent to which an organization detects,
addresses and corrects flaws, or (more specifically) the extent to which
component responsibilities within an organization are updated based on detected
flaws.
4. Screen the leading indicators to determine the most relevant and important indicators:
a. Based on the degree of impact they have on the system (e.g. low impact: only a
single component is impacted; high impact: multiple subsystems are impacted).
b. Based on short term, intermediate term, and long term impacts.
c. Based on the sensitivity of the leading indicator.
5. Use measurable metrics for the developed leading indicators, collect data, evaluate and
monitor performance, and take corrective actions when necessary.
6. Repeat Steps 3-5 periodically, and whenever there are system changes.
This proposed method is demonstrated in Figure 4.3.
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System hazards
Requirements,
safety
constraints, and
risk controls
Control Structure
Step 3
4-1.
CD
CDQ
CD
CD
0
C0
Step 4
Step 1
Step 2
Leading Indicators
Development Process
"Engine" (Figure 4.2)
4.2.4 Description of the Method
Step 1: Establish a team, define the scope, and identify system boundaries.
In this step, a multi-disciplinary team needs to be established, the scope needs to be defined, and
system boundaries need to be defined. Input(s) and output(s) to and from the system need to be
defined as well to ensure that the interactions are captured.
Step 2: Collect data for system hazards, requirements, safety constraints, and risk controls, as
well as for the developed control structure with responsibilities and feedbacks.
This step can be achieved using STAMP based process hazard analysis (STPA). Refer to
Section 3.1.2 for an introduction to STAMP.
System Hazards: System hazards need to be identified, which are "system states or sets of
conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case environment conditions, will lead to
an accident (loss) [30]." The general hazards in the process industry can be defined as loss of
containment events, which can lead to death or injury to people, harm to the environment, asset
damage, and/or an operational/business loss. These need to be systematically identified at the
different stages of the facility life cycle. More specific hazards can be developed depending on
the system under study.
Particular focus should be given to loss of containment of flammable, combustible, unstable,
corrosive, asphyxiating, reactive, toxic, and/or pyrophoric hydrocarbons that could result in any
type of adverse consequence. The specific system hazards can be defined depending on the
initial state of the hydrocarbon, ignition, wind, congestion etc. At an initial state, i.e. the source,
hydrocarbons can be in the form of liquids at atmospheric pressure, pressurized liquids, or
pressurized gas. Hydrocarbons can be flammable, toxic, or both. In general, consequences
could be fires, explosions or flammable/toxic clouds. Process hazards are the major hazards of
concern in a chemical plant, which could involve:
* Gas releases, which could result in gas dispersion of flammable and toxic material, jet
fires if ignited immediately, flash fires if there is a delayed ignition, and/or vapor cloud
explosions if there is a delayed ignition and a congested area;
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e Liquid releases, which could result in flammable liquid pools, jet fires if aerosolized and
ignited immediately, and pool fires if there is a delayed ignition;
e Two-phase releases, which can result in combinations of the scenarios described above;
e Pressurized gas vessels, which could result in Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor
Explosions (BLEVE) if exposed to external fires.
Safety Constraints: Risk controls need to be established, starting with the physical system and its
associated control(s), and moving up in the hierarchy to other organizational, management and
social aspects. Risk controls enforce safety constraints. In the process industry, the primary
safety constraints at the physical level are associated with establishing the operational window,
where safety constraints specify the boundaries within which the system and its subsystems must
operate. These boundaries are specified based on what the system or its subsystems can
withstand and on risk assessment findings. The operational window includes pressure,
temperature, flow, and level specifications in which the process must be controlled. Physical
controls to prevent hazards from occurring are the operational parameter controls, (pressure,
temperature, etc.), alarms, shutdown system(s), and relief valves. A loss could occur if these
physical controls fail to function as expected. The operational window and the associated
controls are subsequently governed through the management of change procedures and updates
of operational procedures.
The other main safety constraints are associated with establishing the integrity window, where
safety constraints specify the minimum level of integrity required for equipment (pumps,
compressors, valves, etc.), pipes, tanks, vessels, and so on. Minimum integrity levels are
specified based on the metallurgy used, service, and lifetime of the unit. Maintenance,
inspection, and testing procedures are used to manage integrity, and procedures are updated
through the management of change procedures when changes occur.
Operations staff monitors and control the process by observing deviations and taking the
necessary actions to prevent hazards from occurring. Mitigative controls such as firefighting and
emergency response, although important, are not part of this research as they are reactive in
nature, and the focus of this research is proactive risk management.
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Control Structure: The control structure incorporates the controls and feedback needed to
prevent losses. These controls need to be translated into leading indicators so that they can be
monitored and corrective actions can be taken in those cases when these controls were not
successful in controlling hazards. Figure 3.1 demonstrates a generic STAMP safety control
structure and organizations need to have such control structure in place before developing
leading indicators; this also includes organizational aspects to be taken into consideration with
respect to the complexity and interactions of the system.
Step 3: Use the leading indicators development process "Engine" together with Table 4.2 to
develop leading indicators
The goal of this step is to test if the system specific safety constraints are comprehensive,
adequate, functional, and adaptable. Particular focus should be given to detecting flaws and
monitoring progress.
To this point, the STPA should have already defined hazardous states in the system that would
allow a hazard to occur (loss of containment), and the hazardous states would already have been
translated into safety constraints with the safety control structure (showing feedback and
controls). To detect violations of the safety constraints and hazardous states, leading indicators
can be developed to detect ineffective control(s) based on STPA-based control loops. Ineffective
control can result from inadequate or missing feedback, flaws in the process model, or
inadequate execution of the control actions. Leading indicators can be developed using the
leading indicators development process and associated supporting table, as demonstrated in the
example in Section 4.3.
Step 4: Screen the leading indicators for those that are relevant and important
It is likely that when the above steps are applied, a long list of leading indicators will be found.
Some of these indicators will be more important than others and monitoring them will be more
effective for proactively addressing risk.
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4.3 APPLYING THE METHOD - EXAMPLE
Step 1: Establish a team, define the scope, and identify system boundaries.
Consider the following example for a typical separation unit used in many chemical processing
installations (Figure 4.4) to demonstrate how the safety constraints can be translated into leading
indicators.
Figure 4.4: Typical Separation Unit
Step 2: Collect data for system hazards, requirements, safety constraints, and risk controls, as
well as for the developed Control Structure with responsibilities and feedback.
System Hazards: In this example the hazard is defined as a loss of containment of hydrocarbons.
Safety Constraints: To prevent loss of containment, safety constraints (physical controls) for this
specific example are:
SC. 1: Control the process within its design pressure, both high and vacuum;
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SC.
SC.
SC.
Control Structure: If we take SC. 1 (overpressure) as an example, a specific STPA-based control
loop can be developed as shown in Figure 4.5.
I I
Simple Control Structure
Overpressure for a Separation Unit
Control action not given
(e.g. failure to shutdown,
dysfunctional/unavailable
control/shutdown
systems)
Incorrect control action
(e.g. under designed relief
valve and vessel is not
designed to handle
maximum pressure
Delays in taken action
(e.g. due to pressures and
distractions)
01
Controller
Operator
Inconsistent, incomplete, or
incorrect process model
Controlled Process
[ roS
VLssel
Missing feedback (e.g.
unavailable data to detect
pressure increase)
Incorrect feedback (e.g.
calibration laws)
Delays in feedback (e.g.
maintenance, and inspection
flaws)
Figure 4.5: Separation Unit Control Loop and Causal Factors of Inadequate Control
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2:
3:
4:
5:
Control the process within its design temperature, both high and cryogenic;
Control the flow, accumulation, and level within the design limits;
Control temperature/pressure cycling within their specified ranges;
Control concentrations, phase/state changes, and impurities/contamination within the
design range;
Control the reaction rate/heat of reaction within its safe limits;
Maintain the integrity of the vessel and its associated accessories within the targets;
established for corrosion, erosion, stresses, etc. allowances and within the inspection
limits.
SC. 6:
SC. 7:
Assumptions:
It is assumed for this example and this particular overpressure hazard that the unit would have
pressure control, shutdown and relief systems, the technologies used are adequate, and that there
are no changes in the system. Loss could occur if these physical controls fail to function as
expected, and overpressure would result in a release of hydrocarbons. Leading indicators will be
needed to detect if the controls are functional or not.
Step 3: Use the leading indicators development process "Engine" together with Table 4.2 to
develop leading indicators
Ineffective control can result from inadequate or missing feedback, flaws in the process model,
or inadequate execution of the control actions. It is important to highlight that the controller
receives input from other internal or external components. In this example, only those coming
from components in the immediate higher hierarchy are shown for illustration purposes. For
each of the safety constraints and associated inadequate controls, leading indicators can be
developed using the leading indicators development process and associated supporting table, as
shown in Figure 4.6.
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Hazard: Loss of Containment
Causes: Process Excursions:
Overpressure
Safety Constraint: System should be
operated within the design allowable
pressure
High Level Requirements (Avoid
Overpressure)
e Provide control system, detection
system, emergency shutdown and
isolation systems, depressurizing
system, relief valves, etc.
* Active and passive protection
systems should be provided
e Systems should be maintained
and inspected periodically
e Risk analysis should evaluate
overpressure scenarios and
develop means to correct them
Inadequate Feedback
* Missing feedback (e.g.
unavailable data to detect
pressure increase)
* Incorrect feedback (e.g.
calibration flaws)
* Delays in feedback (e.g.
maintenance, and inspection
flaws)
Inadequate Process Model
* Inconsistent, incomplete, or
incorrect process model
Inadequate Control
" Control action not given (e.g.
failure to shutdown,
dysfunctional/unavailable
control/shutdown systems)
" Incorrect control action (e.g.
under designed relief valve and
vessel is not designed to handle
maximum pressure
* Delays in taking action (e.g.
due to pressures and
distractions)
Leading
(Monitor
Excursions:
Overpressure)
Indicators
Process
Leading indicators are
developed based on the
leading indicators
development process and
associated supporting table.
The results are shown in
Table 4.3.
-- --
---
Figure 4.6: Developing Leading Indicators for the Separation Unit
The previous table summarized the safety constraints, high level requirements, and inadequate
controls associated with overpressure hazards. Leading indicators were developed based on the
leading indicators development process and the associated supporting table (the results are
shown in Table 4.3.)
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Table 4.3: Leading Indicators for the Separation Unit7
Safety SCi. System should be operated within the design allowable pressure
Constraint
Controller Operator
Inadequate SC 1 will not be satisfied if controls are not effective in enforcing it, which can occur if there are
Control inadequate feedback, inadequate process model, and/or inadequate control actions.
Leading Indicators of inadequate control: Indications that controls of overpressure are not functioning as they
should.
Inadequate SCl will not be satisfied if an increasing trend in
feedback pressure readings of the vessel is not detected, or
if the pressure readings exceed the design
pressure envelop without detection.
Inadequate feedback (from the STPA-based Flaws Detection Leading Indicators; Controller:
control loop) Operator
1. Unavailable data to detect pressure increases LIl. Number of requests made by the operator
for providing pressure measurements
2. There are calibration flaws in the pressure L12. Frequency of verifications of pressure
sensors sensors measurements against local actual
readings
3. There are maintenance flaws in fixing faulty L13. Frequency of operations certifications of
pressure sensors completed maintenance work
4. There are inspection flaws in inspecting or L14. Frequency of inspections of vessel and
measuring current working pressure of the associated pipe wall thickness, and frequency of
vessel and its components updates of required operating parameters
Inadequate SC 1 will not be satisfied if there are
process inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process
model model to address an increased pressure.
Inadequate process model (from the STPA-
based control loop)
5. Operational procedures have incorrect or L5. Number of reported incorrect or missing
7 No applicable leading indicators are identified here since it is assumed for this example and this particular
overpressure hazard that the unit would have pressure control, shutdown and relief systems, the technologies used
are adequate, and that there are no changes in the system. Note that if there are missing safety constraints or if
inadequate constraints are used (other than those relating to controlling pressure in this example), they will be
identified when a full analysis is conducted; this could highlight other problems in the overall control structure.
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missing pressure set points, particularly high and
critical pressures
6. Previous increases of pressure that did not
require taking actions, and did not result in any
consequences
7. Periodic reviews and updates of operational
procedures are not conducted and the procedures
do not address updated operational pressure
envelopes
8. Flaws in the automation system logic
SC 1 will not be satisfied if inadequate actions
are taken when there is a pressure increase.
Inadequate control actions (from the STPA-
based control loop)
9. The controller fails to timely shutdown on
high pressure
10. The shutdown systems is dysfunctional
11. The relief valves are under-designed, and/or
the vessel is not designed to handle the increased
pressure
parameters by the operator
L16. Number of pressure increases without the
operator's action
L17. Frequency of updates of operational
procedures and operational window parameters
L18. Number of reported flaws of the
automation system made by the operator
L19. Number of historical delays in taken action
on high pressure by the operator
LI10. Frequency of preventive maintenance of
the shutdown systems
LI 1l. Frequency of design re-ratings and
verifications of existing protection systems
Inadequate
control
actions
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Table 4.4: Additional Leading Indicators for Monitoring Progress at the Facility Level
Rationale: Since it is important that leading indicators detect problems at the facility level, and not only on this
particular system, additional leading indicators are needed. For example, if there are maintenance and/or inspection
flaws at the facility level or at another unit, this is an
separation unit) could be subject to these flaws.
Inadequate feedback the facility level
12. SC1 may not be satisfied if there are overdue safety
critical inspections and maintenance work orders at the
facility level
Inadequate process models at the facility level
13. SC1 may not be satisfied if there are out of date
operating procedures, and backlog in their review at the
facility level
Inadequate control actions at the facility level
14. SCl may not be satisfied if there are a high number
of process excursions at the facility level
indication that any system in the facility (including this
LI12. Number of overdue safety critical inspections and
maintenance work orders
LI 13. Percentage of updated operating procedures
LI14. Number of activations of alarms, shutdown
system, and relief valves
Leading indicators for identifying factors resulting in the flaws and correcting these flaws at the facility level
Rationale: If the flaws that resulted in inadequate control in the separation unit are not investigated and corrected at
the system level, this is an indication that this particular system as well as others in the facility could have other
incidents.
15. SC1 may not be satisfied if the factors causing LIl5. Percentage of completed investigations
overpressure scenarios are not investigated, and/or there
are a number of investigations that were not completed
at the facility level
16. SC1 may not be satisfied if corrective actions to LI16. Percentage of completed actions items (resulting
address the factors that result in overpressure increases from investigations)
are not taken, and/or there are a number of corrective
actions that are not taken
A similar analysis can be conducted for possible violations of other safety constraints associated
with process excursions (e.g. temperature, level, etc.) or violations of integrity degradation
constraints. These excursions can be monitored collectively rather than individually to
determine if problems exist. For example, if there is a defective temperature feedback, there
could also be defective pressure readings, or process monitoring in general that needs to be
added to the above analysis table. This analysis could also be applied to other organizational
safety constraints, depending on the specific system analyzed and the associated specific
constraints and control structure(s). These analyses will vary from one system to another; thus,
they will be the developed leading indicators.
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Leading indicators for detecting dysfunctional or degraded controls at the facility level
5.0 SUMMARY, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSION
5.1 SUMMARY
In this research, a system-based method was developed to assist a hydrocarbon/chemical
processing organization in developing system-based process safety leading indicators. The
purpose of this method is to assist managers and decision-makers in proactively managing risk in
their organizations by identifying better means for developing leading indicators that can monitor
system flaws and, thus, prevent incidents before they occur.
This research involved reviewing the literature and current practices, and defining gaps
particularly in the use of a systems approach for developing leading indicators in the process
industry. It was found that current guidance fall short of addressing the systemic aspects that can
enable the possibility of predicting potential incidents before they occur or detecting the
migration of a system to an unsafe state. Current risk management programs are either reactive
(lack a forward-looking approach), or fragmented (system-based models are not used).
Since chemical processing facilities could gradually change their states from a normal state to an
unsafe state if no effective controls are in place and accidents could occur due to ineffective
controls, treating safety as control problem [8] is necessary. Starting with this concept, and
building on safety control structures and the associated safety constraints, the proposed leading
indicators development method was developed to enable detecting ineffective controls with the
objective of facilitating a more systematic review that would enable a better understanding of the
system, as well as the complex interactions within its subsystems, and external factors. It
suggests that leading indicators can be developed by analyzing the safety controls at the different
levels of the hierarchy, and the approach that can be taken is that if system safety constraints are
violated and inadequate control results, then this would be an indication of ineffective control or
system degradation that could lead to a loss.
To ensure that there is an effective control, it is important to have the means to proactively
correct flaws in the designed control structure, and address changes in the control structure and
changes in the external environment. The proposed method can be the means to achieve this. It
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starts with conducting hazard analysis, and developing safety constraints, and systematically
ensures that the designed control structure works and addresses all hazards and changes, or
provides early warnings if the controls are not working as intended or have deteriorated over
time and have become ineffective. The method facilitates the systematic review of safety
constraints to ensure that controls are comprehensive, adequate, functional, and adaptable. To
ensure that there is an effective control structure, the method calls for detecting flaws, ensuring
the identification of factors resulting in the potential flaws, addressing the flaws at a system
level, and monitoring progress.
5.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This method should be used as a tool to assist in developing leading indicators systematically,
and it assumes that organizations have a risk management program in place, have already
designed an organizational control structure, hazards have been identified, and associated
controls have been put in place. If organizations do not have a safety control structures, and
safety constraints are not developed, the method cannot be used.
Further validation, testing, and adjustment of the method can be an area of future research. The
current research focused testing on its applicability on a single unit during the operational phase,
and the examples were intended for demonstration purposes and are not considered
comprehensive. Further validation would be needed to test its applicability when it is applied at
a facility level, and when it is applied at the different phases of a facility's lifecycle. Particular
focus can be given to the systematic handling of additional ineffective control, or to grouping of
repeated similar leading indicators. Moreover, the method can be tested for its applicability in
other industries.
Another potential area of future research is data visualization and handling of developed leading
indicators. Different sets of leading indicators would be developed for each controller in the
control structure, and the mechanism of transmitting and displaying relevant and important
indicators to the appropriate level and relevant decision-makers based on their control
responsibilities can be researched further.
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Time-sensitivity and lag time between having an indication of ineffective control and the time it
takes to see the impact of actions if taken to address the higher risk. Future research can address
the dynamics of the system. STAMP-based modeling in this research addressed the static safety
control of the system, and did not address the dynamics involved. The dynamics of the system
could be analyzed so that the different reinforcing pressures, feedbacks, expectations, etc. are
incorporated to get a better understanding of the dynamics of ineffective control, and, thus,
having better decision-making. This will help in determining possible decisions that could have
a positive impact on the safety state of the system over time and to assess whether or not these
decisions reinforce safety improvement efforts. Future work can include developing such
models and calibrating them based on plant-specific data.
5.3 CONCLUSION
Although current practices address process safety indicators, system-based leading indicators are
not fully addressed. A more systematic way using STAMP was applied to develop leading
indicators that can uncover system aspects. STAMP-based modeling can be used as a basis for
developing leading indicators as it treats safety as control problem, and it addresses the systemic
aspects rigorously. It helps in identifying ineffective controls, including those associated with
the migration of the system towards an unsafe state, or associated with interdependencies
between barriers. Using STAMP facilitated addressing leading indicators more systematically
and clarified the interactions among the subsystems. The proposed method provides for the
following:
e More focus on the system rather than its components;
e More careful reviews of the controls, integration, and interactions between the
subsystems;
e Clearer definitions of safety-related constraints;
e Better identification and understanding of the interactions between the physical system,
people, the organization, and social aspects;
e Better understanding of how inadequate controls can occur;
* Better reformulation of the problem using a system control structure;
e Uncovering more important roles of the industry and external agencies.
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Using current practices may result in improved safety performance. However, better safety
performance can be achieved by focusing on systems aspects. Safety indicators should garner
information regarding how well the organizational functions meet the desired outcomes.
Monitoring trends, taking actions, or investigating deviations should take place continuously.
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6.0 DEFINITIONS
Accident: An undesired and unplanned (but not necessarily unexpected) event that results in an
(unacceptable) level of loss [30].
Consequence: The outcome arising from an event. There may be one or more consequences that
arise from an event. Consequences may be positive or negative. However, for the purposes of
this thesis, a consequence will mean a negative outcome of any event.
Event: The occurrence of a single or multiple set of circumstances.
Failure: The nonperformance or inability of the system or component to perform its intended
function for a specified time under specified environmental conditions [30].
Hazard: A state or set of conditions of a system (or an object) that, together with other conditions
in the environment of the system (or object), will lead inevitably to an accident (loss event) [30].
Hazard Analysis: The identification of hazards and the assessment of hazard levels [30].
Incident: A near miss or incident is an event that involves no loss (or only minor loss) but with
the potential for loss under different circumstances [30].
Process Safety: A disciplined framework for managing the integrity of hazardous operating
systems and processes by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating and
maintenance practices [28].
Process Safety Event: An unplanned or uncontrolled LOPC of any material including non-toxic
and non-flammable materials from a process, or an undesired event or condition that, under
slightly different circumstances, could have resulted in a LOPC of a material [28].
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Process Safety Hazards: Hazards that can result in major accidents involving the release of
potentially dangerous materials [28].
Process Safety Incidents: Incidents that can have catastrophic effects such as multiple injuries
and fatalities, as well as substantial economic, property, and environmental damage; can also
affect workers inside the facility and members of the public who reside or work nearby [28].
Reliability: The probability that a piece of equipment or component will perform its intended
function satisfactorily for a prescribed time and under stipulated environmental conditions [30].
Risk Control: The process of decision-making for reducing risk through elimination, prevention,
mitigation, and treatment. It involves the implementation, enforcement and re-evaluation from
time to time of the controls [45].
Risk Management: The systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices
to the tasks of analyzing, evaluating, and controlling risk. Risk management is the coordinated
activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk [45].
Safety: Freedom from accidents [30].
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APPENDIX A - ACCIDENTS AND INEFFECTIVE CONTROL
This appendix provides the additional specific STPA-based control loops and the associated
inadequate controls that were developed for the following system components (controllers):
maintenance and inspection staff, engineering staff, and line manager for the BP Texas City Case
Study discussed in Section 3.3.
Al. Maintenance and Inspection Staff
A simplified specific STPA-based control loop is shown in Figure Al, and the associated
inadequate controls are listed in Table Al.
Simple Control Structure
Controller: Maintenance and Inspection Staff
Control action not given
(e.g. failure to report or
fix problems)
Incorrect control action
(e.g. faulty repairs or
incorrect
recommendations)
Delays in taking action
(e.g. due to pressures and
distractions)
Controller
Maintenance and
InspectionStaff
Inconsistent, incomplete, or
incorrect process model
Controlled Process
control/SD
Missing feedback (e.g. no
maintenance or inspection
records and findings)
Incorrect feedback (incorrect
readings and diagnostics)
Delays in feedback (overdue
inspections and
maintenance)
Vessel
Figure Al: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Maintenance and Inspection Staff
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Table Al: Inadequate Control: Maintenance and Inspection Staff
Inadequate SC3 will not be satisfied if integrity degradation of the vessel is not detected. Inadequate feedback
feedback are:
IC 1. Overdue inspections and maintenance
IC2. Incorrect inspection readings or diagnostics
IC3. Lack of inspection and maintenance records and findings
Inadequate SC3 will not be satisfied if there are inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process model to address
process integrity degradation. Inadequate process model are:
model
IC4. Incorrect or missing maintenance and inspection procedures
IC5. Previous overdue inspections and maintenance did not result in any consequences
IC6. Periodic reviews and updates of inspection and maintenance procedures are not conducted
IC7. Flaws in the inspection or maintenance equipment
Inadequate SC3 will not be satisfied if inadequate actions are taken when there is integrity degradation.
control Inadequate control actions are:
actions
IC8. The controller fails to timely report or fix problems
IC9. Faulty repairs or incorrect recommendations
A2. Engineering Staff
A simplified specific STPA-based control loop is shown in Figure A2 and the associated
inadequate controls are listed in Table A2.
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Simple Control Structure
Controller: Engineering Staff
Control action not given
(no recommendations to
fix problem are given)
Incorrect control action
(wrong recommendations
are given)
Delays in taking action
(e.g. due to pressures and
distractions)
Controller
Engineering Staff
Inconsistent, incomplete, or
incorrect process model (risk
assessment process or standards)
Controled Process
control/SD
Vssem
Vessel
Missing feedback
(overlooked hazards)
incorrect feedback (incorrect
analyses, assessments, or
reviews)
Delays in feedback (delayed
risk assessments, reviews)
Figure A2: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Engineering Staff
Table A2: Inadequate Control: Engineering Staff
Inadequate Safety constraints will not be satisfied if system hazards are not detected. Inadequate feedback are:
feedback
IC . Delayed risk assessments and reviews
IC2. Incorrect analyses, assessments, or reviews
IC3. Overlooked hazards
Inadequate Safety constraints will not be satisfied if there are inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process
process model to address system hazards. Inadequate process model are:
model
IC4. Flaws in risk assessment procedures
IC5. Flaws in design standards
IC6. Periodic reviews and updates of procedures and standards are not conducted
Inadequate SC 1 will not be satisfied if inadequate actions are taken when there are hazards identified.
control Inadequate control actions are:
actions
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IC7. No recommendations to address hazards are given
IC8. Incorrect technologies are recommended to address hazards
A3. Line Managers
A simplified specific STPA-based control loop is shown in Figure A3, and the associated
inadequate controls are listed in Table A3.
Simple Control Structure
Controller: Line Managers
Control action not given
(no authorization given or
no resources allocated)
Incorrect control action
(Incorrect decisions)
Delays in taking action
(e.g. due to pressures and
distractions)
Controller
Line Managers
Inconsistent, incomplete, or
incorrect process model
Controlled Process
low, Staff
Missing feedback (no
reports)
Incorrect feedback (incorrect
reports)
Delays in feedback (delayed
reports)
Figure A3: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Line Managers
Table A3: Inadequate Control: Line Managers
Inadequate Safety constraints will not be satisfied if hazards are not timely and correctly reported. Inadequate
feedback feedback are:
ICI. Delayed reports
IC2. Incorrect reports
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IC3. Missing Reports
Inadequate Safety constraints will not be satisfied if there are inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process
process model to address reported hazards. Inadequate process model are:
model
IC4. Inadequate reporting procedures
IC5. Inadequate prioritization
Inadequate Safety constraints will not be satisfied if inadequate actions are taken when there are reported
control hazards. Inadequate control actions
actions
IC6. No resources or authorization given
IC7. Incorrect decisions
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